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Freedom to Do What?
Institutional Neutrality, Academic
Freedom, and Academic
Responsibility
David Barnhizer
Our topic is whether law schools should remain institutionally neutral,
presumably concerning the fundamental political and moral issues that be-
siege our society. The answer depends on several competing considerations,
including one's concept of the university as either ivory tower or critical force
obligated to serve the society that sustains it. I opt in the direction of the
university as social force while also accepting the validity of the passive mode
and seeing the dispassionate search for knowledge as a means to serve impor-
tant human needs. The abstract formulation of the university as institutionally
neutral is in many ways illusory because it stops short of understanding the
true functions of knowledge, power, and mission.
The formulation I offer goes directly to the very conception of what we
mean by institutional neutrality. What is it the university is to be neutral
about? Obviously not knowledge, truth, precision of method, and the excite-
ment of discovery. We must therefore be discussing the extent to which
universities take stands on significant political and moral issues. And, realisti-
cally, we are not talking about institutions taking specific positions on volatile
issues but about individual faculty doing so in their scholarship, their teach-
ing, or both.
For our purposes I assume that the institutional university seeks a balanced
neutrality and does not take a corporate position in favor of much of anything
other than its basic values and mission. The university, then, functions much
like the institutional foundations of the free market in a capitalist economy, in
which an overarching structure and set of dynamic values allow the free
operation of human judgment. As with the free market's invisible hand, the
premise is that the weight of the individual decisions of faculty concerning
what to research and teach will move the system in the direction it ought to go.
A critical presumption is that academic freedom serves this function in the
"marketplace of ideas." The question then becomes that of the degree of
freedom of choice on the part of individual academics, and the extent to
David Baruhizer is Professor of Law, Cleveland State University.
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which they have the right to take controversial positions in their teaching
and research.
The issue is not whether faculty have that right, because in fact it is their
responsibility when their chosen work leads to it, but whether the right is
essentially unbounded. Are there limiting principles, and to what extent does
the idea of academic freedom protect individual academics from the conse-
quences of others' qualitative judgments about the positions they have taken?
That is, what if the work is generally agreed to be stupid; false, misleading,
or-more troubling-outside the primary tenets of the controlling academic
orthodoxy?
It is ironic that for much of our history academic freedom had little
relevance to what law schools and law faculty did. It is even fair to ask what the
law schools were doing in the university. Certainly the formal connection
served the interests of both the universities and the legal profession, but for all
practical purposes the elite university law schools served a narrow segment of
the legal profession, the large corporate law firms. Their intellectual souls
were already bought and paid for in a Faustian bargain that lasted a century
and still has significant influence. It mattered little whether academic free-
dom existed, because law faculty did virtually nothing to challenge or offend,
or to require invoking academic freedom as a protection. The faculties were
homogeneous. Their treatment of legal doctrine was not only neutral but
neutered. Controversies were few and generally trivial.
This is no longer true. For virtually the first time in the history of the
American law school, the idea of academic freedom has meaning and signifi-
cance. The law schools are now being subjected to such intense stresses from
both internal and external forces that there is a risk of intellectual and
political repression just at the point when many legal scholars are finally
seeking to extend their discipline. The fragile protection afforded by aca-
demic freedom is one of the only available defenses.
To determine the importance of academic freedom we must understand
the changing context of the university institution of which the law schools are
a part. We must address five fundamental questions:
1. What are the valid purposes of the university as we move into a
period filled with immense challenges?
2. What core of knowledge must be preserved and insulated against
the pressures created by short-term societal demands?
3. What areas of inquiry are no longer vital or valid?
4. What new areas of inquiry should take priority?
5. What skills, values, and methodologies do academics need to fulfill
their responsibilities within the university?
1. I have attempted to address these questions in a series of articles. They include Prophets,
Priests and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in
America, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 127 (1988) [hereinafter Prophets]; The University Ideal and the
American Law School, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 109 (1989) [hereinafter University Ideal]; The
Revolution in American Law Schools, 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 227 (1989) [hereinafter Revolu-
tion]; The Purposes of the University in the First Quarter of the Twenty-first Century, 22
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1124 (1992) [hereinafter Purposes]; TheJustice Mission of American Law
Schools, 40 Clev. St. L. Rev. 285 (1992).
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Academic Freedom as Purposive Responsibility
Assume for purposes of this discussion that academic freedom ought to
exist. Granting this premise does not mean that university faculty are achiev-
ing the goals that justify the great privilege of academic freedom and its
corollary, tenure. Academic freedom is not an end in itself; it exists only so
that higher ends may be achieved. If those higher ends are not being achieved-
or, as in most law schools until recently, rarely even thought about-then
there is no reason to worry much about academic freedom for law faculty. The
tragedy is that there has been a shocking paucity of important controversial
work that has challenged an often unjust system.
My point is not that mainstream doctrinal scholarship of the kind that has
dominated academic discourse in the law schools is illegitimate or useless.
Some unquestionably has been, but doctrine is an important lens through
which justice, morality, and power are translated and applied from the dimen-
sions of abstract theory and preference to the concreteness of law in action.
Mainstream doctrinal scholarship surely has a contribution to make to an
efficiently operating system of law. But, as traditionally done, it is not inher-
ently intellectual, nor is it in fact "scientific." Our problem is not that we have
taken doctrine as the central focus of our work, but that we have done such an
injustice to the richness and complexity of doctrine. Much of the doctrinal
scholarship we produce would have been generated even if the law schools
had been honest professional schools owing no obligation to the university.
The scholarship might have been done more concisely and clearly, without
the intellectual pretension that tends to characterize our work, but its tenor
and quality would have been very similar. If this is a reasonably accurate
observation, then it seems obvious that academic freedom has mattered little
to legal scholars, and that American law faculty have failed to serve the mission
of the university, whether we speak of the ivory tower of the "pure" scholar or
the more active ideal.
Academic freedom is a privilege and a responsibility, not a personal and
unfettered license for the misuse of the increasingly scarce social resource
represented by each faculty position. Academic freedom nurtures the intense
desire to know, create, and serve our society in some meaningful way.2 It
should be used to develop and refine knowledge, confront injustices and
abuses of power, and seek solutions to fundamental dilemmas. It is abused
when used to conceal lack of honest commitment to the basic mission of the
university.
Academic freedom is intended to allow university scholars to fulfill their
intellectual mission without fear of reprisals. It imposes a duty on administra-
tors and other powerful interests to keep their distance. The power to keep
hostile or incompatible forces at arm's length is becoming increasingly impor-
tant as the inhabitants of the academic world are pressured to serve specific
agendas. The fact is that academics in many disciplines, and particularly law,
must know about and respond to important social needs. But if they become
2. See, e.g., University Ideal, supra note 1.
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dominated by administrators, politicized movements, and special interest
groups, academics' ability to perceive and adapt intelligently will be under-
mined. Unfortunately, many academics are quite happy to serve external
masters and, in this strange new world we have created, would wonder what is
wrong in their doing so.
We seldom allow ourselves to remember that academic freedom is purpo-
sive, and its purposes are nearly all human-centered in some way. We speak as
if there were a Platonic form of the university located somewhere in a nonex-
istent dimension of absolute reality to which we nonetheless aspire, divorced
from any necessary connection to humanity. The truth is both more basic and
more useful. The university is a social organism that has little reason for
existing unless it contributes in fundamental ways to its society.' Truth seeking
is an undeniable and exciting element of that process. So is preserving and
transmitting knowledge, learning clarity of thought and expression, contrib-
uting to the specific social needs of the moment, and anticipating the needs of
the emerging society.4
Institutions of higher learning are responsible for helping our increasingly
beleaguered society adapt to change and challenge.5 Those universities which
do not adapt risk becoming sterile museums of arcane dogma much as
occurred several centuries ago at Oxford and Cambridge, forcing the British
to create a new, more vital, university system in the nineteenth century.6
Regardless of impassioned rhetoric about the medieval university, the univer-
sity in history has always served important societal needs. Of course, who.
possesses the power to define those needs is a critical issue. While existing
universities tend to be resistant to change, they have nevertheless adapted or
become largely irrelevant. Such a shift in perspective must happen again
because few, if any, institutions other than the university possess the organiza-
tional scale, resources, continuity, or energy to focus systematically and criti-
cally on fundamental social needs.
Universities, fields of knowledge, and societies go through cycles in which
the intensity of their need for knowledge varies radically.7 The cycles are never
congruent because of an inevitable lag between a society's need for knowledge
and the time in which the universities and relevant disciplines recognize the
emerging needs and are able to adjust. Society, the various disciplines, and the
university are therefore always to some extent out of synch. In a period like the
present, when we need new approaches, skills, and insights, the backward-
looking orientation of most academics (stemming variously from our arro-
gance, ignorance, outmoded perceptions, natural resistance to change, and
fear) does not serve the purposes of the university as vital social organism.
3. See Purposes, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Purposes and the Performance of
Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the Year 2000, at 1 (New York, 1973).
5. See Purposes, supra note 1.
6. See Frederick Binkerd Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832, at 102 (New York, 1963).
7. See Charles David Axelrod, Studies in Intellectual Breakthrough 2-3 (Amherst, 1979).
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The five questions I posed earlier are particularly difficult to answer be-
cause an immediate response by many academics will be that in criticizing our
failure to fulfill the underlying purposes of academic freedom and tenure, I
am calling for an abandonment of the traditional core of Western knowledge
in favor of full immersion in socially relevant issues of the kind that polarized
the university world in the 1960s. This is not at all what I am urging. Historical,
literary, moral, and philosophical insights provide both context and living
principles. At a minimum such traditions join us together culturally. Far
beyond that minimum they provide an inexhaustible core of principles that
can guide our best judgments and teach us how to think. In my own teaching
and research, for example, I continually draw on such sources as Aristotle,
Plato, Locke, and Hobbes in discussions concerning the functions of society,
the meaning ofjustice and injustice, and the lighter and darker qualities of
human nature. These sources provide a shared vocabulary that allows us to
penetrate to the central meaning of critical concepts and dilemmas and to
communicate with each other about fundamental concerns. Law schools have
failed intellectually in large part because they ignored these sources, disdain-
ing not only the philosophical and moral roots of law but the concrete realities
of law practice and law in action. Instead of understanding law as a richly
textured human process, law faculty have settled for an almost static, two-
dimensional system that fails even to understand doctrine adequately.
For an academic discipline such as law, one that is inextricably tied to social
action and the application of power, the refusal to address concerns ofjustice
and injustice, social needs, and institutional politics and policies is a funda-
mental abuse of academic responsibility to seek truth and challenge the
injustices of vested interest and power. The extreme preoccupation with
appellate doctrine that dominated discourse among legal scholars for more
than a century is a pseudo-intellectual episode about which legal academics
ought to be embarrassed.' We refused to examine the more important and
interesting elements of particular doctrinal systems; we remained oblivious to
the nature of doctrine as a vital political construct.' When we accept that
doctrine has intrinsic political and distributional consequences, it becomes
obvious that "neutrality" has already fallen victim to power: by being silent we
inevitably support the values and political choices that underlie particular
doctrines, either accepting them totally or refusing to challenge them.
The University Ideal, Truth Seeking, and Academic Freedom
Assume the only legitimate justification for the privilege of academic free-
dom and tenure is to allow academics to pursue and communicate truth. This
demands the strongest commitment both to pursuit and to communication.10
8. See, e.g., Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the
1980s, at 16 (Chapel Hill, 1983) (characterizing legal scholarship as unimpressive "regurgita-
tion" of doctrine).
9. The structure and potential of doctrine is outlined and discussed in University Ideal, supra
note 1.
10. "The intellectual's duty is to look 'at the political sphere from without, judging it by, and
admonishing it in the name of, the standards of truth accessible to him. He speaks, in the
biblical phrase, truth to power.'" Arthur Schlesinger,Jr., Intellectual's Role: Truth to Power?
Wall St.J., Oct. 12, 1983, at 28 (quoting HansJ. Morgenthau).
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The 'means of pursuit vary widely depending on the discipline, as do the types
of knowledge and insights sought. Even the definition of what is true will vary
with the discipline's subject matter. But at the center of the quest in all
academic disciplines must be the desire to know.
While the truth-seeking mission is easily described in general terms, the
reality is far from the ideal. For too many academics, freedom has become
privilege, freedom without true responsibility. Universities are afraid to deal
with this problem. Many academics, I hope the majority, fulfill their obliga-
tions to seek truth with honor. But too many are abusing their privileged
positions. Too many, and this is certainly a problem in legal scholarship, fail to
ask themselves what it is that would be worth pursuing, not for personal
aggrandizement but in order to make contributions of intellectual and social
consequence. They have been acculturated into pre-existing research and
teaching agendas defined by the subpart of their particular discipline, which
subpart itself rarely asks why this discipline exists, and in what way it should
contribute to the world of knowledge. Others have increasingly chosen to ally
themselves with specific schools or movements and are allowing those ideolo-
gies to substitute for their individual pursuit of truth. This I discuss below.
The rules of the research and teaching games are already set for most
academics when they enter a discipline's ranks. None of us comes to an
academic position with John Locke's tabula rasa. Our slates are filled with
information, chiseled deeply with the rules of the disciplinary medium in
which we will spend our lives. Its principles and methods are firmly established
during the period of graduate education and reinforced in the promotion
and review processes that lead to a tenured appointment.
This process of acculturation means that academic "freedom" is not really
freedom in the sense of creativity and wide-ranging intellectual curiosity, but a
bounded process that operates only within tight little boxes of orthodox
concepts. We are unwilling or even unable to think of truly provocative
matters.12 We accept the primary rules of our discipline's mainstream thinkers
because that is the path of least resistance, and we perceive our task only from
within an already organized system of thought."3 We have, for example, long
urged the importance of interdisciplinary linkages. But the efforts have been
halting at best in some disciplines, nonexistent in most. We fail to examine the
connections that would help us build bridges between related or overlapping
disciplinary constructs. We are little more than pieces of an unassembled
puzzle, strewn about on a cluttered tabletop of knowledge. Academics trapped
11. For examples see William G. Hollingsworth, Controlling Post-Tenure Scholarship: A Brave
New World Beckons? 41 J. Legal Educ. 141 (1991); see also Daniel S. Greenberg, Tenure's
Cushy Bunkers Under Fire, Clev. Plain Dealer, Dec. 21, 1989, at 9-B; Anthony DePalma, Rare
Dismissal on California Faculty, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1991, atA17 (first dismissal of tenured
professor in 123 years).
12. See Axelrod, supra note 7.
13. Jacques Ellul warns us: "Education... is becoming oriented toward the specialized end of
producing technicians; and, as a consequence, toward the creation of individuals useful only
as members of a technical group, on the basis of the current criteria of utility. .. ." The
Technological Society, trans.John Wilkinson, 349 (New York, 1964).
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unknowingly within the puzzle are convinced they are at the center of knowl-
edge because in their ignorance they are unaware of the limits of their
concepts. Even worse, they are unable to recognize truly meaningful new
material that fails to fit into their pre-existing conceptual structures. Many
academics seem to operate from an inchoate faith that somehow, somewhere,
there exists a God of Knowledge who is monitoring their efforts and assem-
bling the puzzle, thus relieving them of the responsibility.
If incoherence and lack of connection describe one part of our problem,
another part is that academic systems define what will be or should be almost
entirely in a context ofwhat is and was. As I have suggested elsewhere, we have
entered a cycle in which the university must redefine the way it serves our
society.14 But instead of leading, our academic systems are hiding behind the
rhetoric of academic freedom while refusing to accept the burden of their
academic responsibility. We began with the assumption that academic free-
dom is a vital element of the university. But if academics refuse to use their
freedom to examine emerging needs, to differentiate among different ap-
proaches, and to integrate alternative perspectives and skills so that they can
guide their societies, they are failing to lead the way into the next generation.
The problem of achieving creative change is exacerbated because academ-
ics who have risen to leadership in the law schools have tenure and, conse-
quently, the power to impose overt and covert sanctions on younger academ-
ics. This often has a chilling effect on the creative energy of newer faculty. If
there is to be a creative break in such a system, it often must come by direct
confrontation. This unfortunately produces schisms that become rigidly ideo-
logical. It becomes more a political conflict than an intellectual one, and the
new positions are defined (and distorted) by their opposition to the orthodox
traditions they are challenging rather than by their own inherent quality. This
politicization of knowledge has happened in American law schools.
Academic Freedom and American Law Schools
What do academic freedom and responsibility, the politics and behaviors of
orthodox disciplines threatened by demands for change, and the politicization
of knowledge mean in the context of American law schools? First, as Peter
Byrne observed in his paper, law schools are in a deceptive period of abun-
dance. Enrollments, once thought to be in serious decline, have surged
during the past decade. Law faculty have a good thing going. Professors in
other disciplines consider us to be pampered and privileged: paid more than
most other academics, yet responsible for fewer classes, able to teach whatever
we choose,\subject to less interference from our administrations, and evalu-
ated according to less stringent tenure and promotion standards. We have
also had enormous freedom to take time off and to consult extensively. Simply
put, American law faculty have one of the cushiest jobs in the entire world.
If academic freedom does in fact drive an academic system toward the
highest levels of creativity and productivity, we should be able to examine the
14. See Purposes, supra note 1.
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intellectual contributions of law schools to find out whether academic
freedom works as intended: to what extent has the body of knowledge
produced by scholars in American law schools offered new insights, im-
proved the conditions of American society, and developed efficient and
effective solutions?
The answers are not obvious. As recently as fifteen years ago they were in
many ways both obvious and embarrassing, but that is no longer so. 5 There
are various factors involved in the unfolding of the often sterile Langdellian
tradition as well as the revolutionary changes law schools are currently experi-
encing, few of which can be dealt with in this brief commentary. One factor is
of course the always uneasy dualistic nature of law schools as both academic/
professional and academic/graduate institutions.16 We organize the curricu-
lum the way we do because that is how we have always done it, not because we
are continually seeking the best ways to facilitate learning and organize our
subject matter. Academic freedom has been used to protect us from changing.
Another serious problem is that while law schools have immense academic
freedom within universities, which neither understand nor care much about
what the schools are doing as long as they do not cost more than they earn,
they are clearly intellectually inhibited when the influences of the organized
bar and bar examiners are factored in. The subject matter requirements of bar
examinations and the curricular regulations of the American Bar Association
help anchor the schools to a structure of subject matter that lacks internal
intellectual logic. It does not even reflect how law works in practice, nor can it
be justified from a serious intellectual perspective. Unfortunately, the control
by the profession suits most law faculty quite well because it justifies their
failure to innovate.
For almost a century of the Langdellian era, legal scholars proclaimed law
to be a science, value-neutral and apolitical, distinct from morality and jus-
tice.' 7 All that was real and human about the law was placed in a tightly sealed
box labeled "notlaw." Consequently, academic law as taught and written about
by legal academics erected barriers to the academic freedom of those who
sought to challenge what they perceived as its sterility. As with most powerful
orthodox systems, the barriers were for the most part invisible, accepted
because they were the unstated values of the system within which we were all
trained. The fact that the law schools bothered to name a movement Legal
Realism when its main premise was the simple and obvious assertion that
human attitudes and values were an inevitable part of law that needed study
does much to expose the inadequacy and rigidity of the "scientific" Langdellian
approach to the study of law. The box into which academic thought forced law
was really a pressure cooker that could not possibly hold all that law repre-
sents. The cooker exploded about fifteen years ago and we are now trying to
put it back together.
15. See generally Revolution, supra note 1.
16. 2 Anton-Herman Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America 197 (Norman, 1965).
17. See Prophets, supra note 1.
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The Scholarship of Rage
The last twenty years have been revolutionary for American law schools.
Transformations have occurred in what is taught as well as what is being
written.' There is a fundamental tension between the ways various interest
groups among law school faculty perceive and seek to fulfill their vision of
legal education and scholarship. The conflict emerges from the competing
desire to be academically or intellectually legitimate in the traditional sense,
and the often incompatible desire to use the power of law to alter the
conditions of society, after first altering the conditions of the law schools to fit
whatever image is preferred.
The revolution in legal scholarship has not been coherent or always sub-
stantive as much as it has been political. Many law faculty are pursuing
personal intellectual and political agendas beneath the umbrella of legal
scholarship. 9 In the process, intellectual curiosity and vision have often been
subordinated to desired consequence. The activist/reformist agenda is, for
example, to some extent being driven by tacit alliances between interest
groups in American society and law faculty who share their vision. Another
thread of this process seeks the theoretical roots of law and social justice. This
theoretical strand is energized, ironically, both by relatively pure intellectual
desires to know and by the awareness that the political group able to dominate
discourse on deep principles controls an important aspect of the political
system.2" Such goals seem admirable on first impression-many of them
compatible with my own preferences and beliefs. But the existence of such
powerful personal preferences should immediately warn us of the dangers of
extreme subjectivity and the pursuit of personal agendas.
The problem with this behavior is that the university has no special mean-
ing unless scholars are committed, above all, to finding the truth. The univer-
sity is a time machine of sorts, one that spans the past, present, and future.
Each element must be honored or we risk corrupting the very institution that
sustains us. This does not mean that we must be apolitical, but that we are
obligated to seek truth and balance in our teaching and scholarship, regard-
less of what we do in our public interest lives as aggressive advocates.
At base, however, there is an even deeper problem that can obscure truth
and reason. Much of the change in law schools and legal scholarship is being
generated by deep-seated and entirely understandable anger about the dehu-
manizing treatment of particular categories of people by social and political
institutions, treatment in which law and its institutions (including law schools)
have often been tacit partners. A dominant dynamic is rage at injustice, not
only vicariously experienced injustice, but-for many of the new scholars-
directly experienced injustice. Perceived discrimination against people who
are black, Hispanic, female, gay, or lesbian often leads to an experientially
based form of scholarship and teaching, a form very different from what we
18. See Revolution, supra note 1.
19. See id.
20. See Prophets, supra note 1.
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have seen in any historical model of the university. The current situation in
legal scholarship, and to a lesser extent in law teaching, is as if clones of
Thomas Paine had suddenly come to life on a hundred American law faculties
and had begun to write political tracts aimed at legitimating their individual
points of view and fomenting revolution.
21
This is putting great pressure on law schools. We do not have a model that
allows us to deal with the new scholarship. Many who engage in such scholar-
ship, because of the power of their own negative experiences or the force of
their empathy with others, can have great difficulty even considering the
potential validity of positions not fully consistent with their own value systems.
Of course this also has much to do with the nature of political struggle, in
which tolerance is taken for weakness and interpreted as concession. Because
political ideologues cannot or will not see truth in others' analyses or flaws in
their own, we have raging nondebates over political correctness. We also have
scholarship that is intellectually empty but, like all forms of effective propa-
ganda, uses the right slogans. The more traditional social activist scholars,
many of whom emerged from the civil rights movement (I include myself in
this group), are in some ways different from the new generation of scholars-
a difference perhaps definable by the distinction between deep compassion
and identification of self as victim. While the rage and resentment of the new
breed is generally, but not always, buried in academic language, their distress
and anger are deep, personal, and powerful. They are irreversibly altering the
nature of scholarship and teaching in American law schools, as well as rela-
tionships among law faculty.
The scholarship of rage has flooded into the law schools as they have
diversified their faculty. First women, and now African-Americans, Hispanics,
gays, and lesbians have become increasingly forceful. Each group has formed
into a political movement protesting conditions seen as unjust and intoler-
able, which in many instances are. There is little ground for compromise, and
the schools have become battlegrounds of the movements. In one sense, this is
about as free as an academic institution ever gets. It is also undisciplined and
increasingly intolerant. It could destroy whatever intellectual legitimacy the
law schools may lay claim to, but the only alternative is an at least equally
destructive repression. The key point is that no one can stop what is occurring.
We are all caught in the midst of a storm filled with sound, fury, an occasional
burst of hot air, and, I hope, a cleansing force that will leave us revitalized if
only we can survive the transition and mature in the process.
Political and Institutional Neutrality
The topic of this panel concerns institutional neutrality in the university
law school, but neutrality is a false and misleading concept in the process of
seeking truth about law, politics, and justice. It is more valid to insist on
21. In The True Believer. Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements 120 (New York, 1951),
Eric Hoffer observes that the man of words "undermines established institutions, discredits
those in power, weakens prevailing beliefs and loyalties."
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fairness, diversity, honesty, and tolerance. The simple fact is that neutrality or
apoliticality is itself inevitably political in the context in which we operate.
Politics and concern for just resolutions of fundamentally unjust situations
have flooded into our teaching and legal scholarship. We cannot push back
the tide, nor should we. But we have not yet learned how to cope with our
new roles.
The questions are not about whether law schools ought to be politically
neutral, but about the need to be intellectually honest and open, able tojustify
intellectually and morally every component of our work, every fundamental
premise upon which we rely. This responsibility applies both to those who seek
to preserve and those who challenge. Forcing ourselves toward intellectual
honesty may lead us to truth but seldom should lead to neutrality. In this way
we drive our intellectual processes, exposing ourselves to risks and to others'
judgments.
A key point of our academic responsibility is to refuse to allow either
ourselves or our students to tolerate intolerance. In my Jurisprudence course,
for example, I try to help students develop a methodology that forces them to
take nothing for granted, to challenge themselves and their own beliefs and
assumptions as well as my own, and to understand the potential validity of
others' positions even if they do not agree with them. We do this in the context
of Roe v. Wade,22 a case guaranteed to invite conflict and intolerance. As
teachers we must challenge and be open to challenge-open to law students
questioning our unstated premises and saying, "Explain your politics. Justify
your politics. Why did you make that statement? Show us why you were able to
reach that conclusion." In the climate of law and law schools, political and
institutional neutrality is a mirage. We cannot do it.
As societal criticisms of lawyers and law schools intensify, the schools must
be able to articulate in good faith the special and unique reasons they exist or
should exist, and the contributions they can make to American society. Few of
these contributions involve matters about which it is possible to be politically
neutral. They involve making a series of judgments about what the society
needs, in the process attempting to answer some difficult questions: What is
the nature ofjustice? What is the nature of resisting injustice? How should law
and lawyers respond to maldistributions of economic resources? How can the
law be used to facilitate a fair allocation of resources, opportunities, rights,
and privileges?
Contrary to the implications of an ancient Chinese curse, we have the good
fortune to be living in an interesting time. When I first came into the law
school world more than twenty years ago, it was abysmally homogeneous. In
the next ten years the changes within the law schools were profound. For the
last twenty-five years, in a process begun with the civil rights movement of the
1960s, we have been enmeshed in a dynamic process that has been politicized
in dealing with issues of rights and justice. It is far from complete, and it is
important that we view the law schools as unfinished institutions reflecting a
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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rapidly changing moment in time. We are changing, and responding to
political and social needs is part of that change. Redefining and challenging
the role of the lawyer is part of that change. Redefining and challenging the
role of the legal scholar is part of that change. Understanding how legal
scholars and law schools can better contribute to society should be a special
part of the changes we seek to achieve. All of these are things we must make
explicit, and that is something we have never done very well.
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